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SELECTIVE PROSECUTION: A VIABLE
DEFENSE AGAINST A CHARGE OF
TRANSMITTING AIDS?
In the past three years, the number of legislative proposals' relating
to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2 and its predeces-
sor forms has increased dramatically.3 Provisions that make transmit-
ting the AIDS virus a crime prevail among the newly proposed AIDS-
related laws.4 These criminal statutes involve a variety of elements,
intent requirements and penalties.5 Public hysteria motivates some leg-
islatures; others desire to deter communication of disease.
1. See AIDS Law & Litigation Reporter at 1-37 (summarizing AIDS laws from the
1987 State Legislative Sessions).
2. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) defines AIDS as a disease characterized
by the presence of one or more of four opportunistic infections or Kaposi's sarcoma.
AIDS involves extreme impairment to the immune system and is acquired through the
exchange of bodily fluids particularly blood and semen. Schultz, AIDS and the Crimi-
nal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 65, 65-67 (1988).
3. Id. A virus originally termed HTLV-III (Human T-cell Lymphotropic Virus
Type III) and now commonly referred to as HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) is
present in the blood of AIDS victims. As of yet, scientists are unsure whether the virus
alone causes AIDS or whether the virus in conjunction with other factors causes AIDS.
In any event, scientists estimate that at least one-half of those who carry the virus will
ultimately contract AIDS. Id.
4. The proposals reach direct person to person transmission as well as acts which
facilitate indirect transmission such as donation of infected blood. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-32-102 (1986); California SB 2384. Some proposals reach conduct which
does not actually or potentially transmit AIDS but is related to the spread of disease.
See Tennessee HB 1827 (withholding information from a health care provider by any-
one diagnosed as carrying AIDS is a crime); Louisiana H.B. 1640, Act 878, 1987 Laws
(it is a misdemeanor for a physician or other person reporting the death of a patient
known or diagnosed as having AIDS or the AIDS virus to fail to notify the coroner).
See I AIDS Law and Litigation Reporter, 9-23.
5. See supra note 4 and infra notes 20-22.
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The prevalence of AIDS among homosexual men creates the poten-
tial for selective enforcement of criminal laws against homosexual
men.6 At some level, the possibility of discriminatory application has
influenced adoption of legislation criminalizing transmission, both in
terms of content and enactment decisions. Some policy makers resist
enacting transmission statutes because of their concern about bias
against homosexuality. Other policy makers support such legislation
due to their own, or their constituency's, bias against homosexuality.
AIDS exists among both homosexual and heterosexual persons.7
Consequently, the laws which are not facially specific to homosexual
men are enforceable against both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Fur-
thermore, regardless of the underlying purposes of these laws,' they
purport to serve the interests of both homosexual and heterosexual
people because both groups are at risk of contracting the AIDS virus.
Criminal sanctions against AIDS transmission presents a policy di-
lemma. On the one hand, AIDS is a communicable and fatal disease
that can be used as a weapon. The potential use of the disease to inflict
physical and emotional harm warrants criminal proscription. On the
other hand, prosecutorial abuse of such sanctions may lead to unfair
persecution of an already-beleaguered homosexual community. This
Article will assess whether policy makers should address the potential
for discriminatory prosecution when homosexuals can utilize the de-
fense of selective prosecution. The answer to this question requires an
assessment of the viability of the selective prosecution defense under
the Constitution. State law may provide additional protections against
selective prosecution. The availability of such additional protection,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.9
6. Field and Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 46, 55 (1987) (hereinafter Field); See also Schultz, supra note 2, at 70 n.29; cf
Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory
Proposal, 14 HoFsTRA L.REv. 91 (1985) (addressing the role of criminal laws in encour-
aging behavior modification to limit the spread of AIDS).
7. See Redfield, Markham, Salahuddin, Wright, Sarngadharn & Gallo, Heterosexu-
ally Acquired HTLV-I1/LAV Disease, AIDS-Related Complex and AIDS, 254 J.
A.M.A. 2094 (1985).
8. See Field, supra note 6, at 55 (criminal laws would not be effective as a public
health measure; in fact, they would be counterproductive in that they could potentially
discourage testing and revealing health status to partners). See also Schultz, supra note
2, at 110 n.212 (discussing problems of proof and the statute's effect of discouraging
AIDS victims from revealing the disease to physicians, public health authorities and
partners).
9. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 71 n.34, listing the following: Brennan, State Consti-
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Part I describes the various statutes, both proposed and enacted,
criminalizing AIDS transmission. Because these laws are novel, no re-
ported cases of prosecutions exist thereunder. Prosecutors, however,
have brought a handful of cases involving potential AIDS transmission
under traditional criminal statutes that proscribe offenses against the
person. Part II surveys fact patterns in these cases to illustrate the
circumstances giving rise to the charges. Part III defines the require-
ments for establishing a defense of selective prosecution. Finally, Part
IV examines cases where defendants have raised the defense of selective
prosecution on the basis of homosexuality.
PART I
While some commentators disfavor laws which criminalize the
transmission or potential transmission of the AIDS virus,1 0 at least
one-third of the states are considering such legislation.' I Some states
have already adopted such criminal statutes. 2 Those legislators view
criminal laws prohibiting AIDS transmission as a logical extension of
existing laws 3 criminalizing the transmission of venereal disease. 4
Although violation of laws relating to venereal disease usually consti-
tutes a misdemeanor, law enforcement officers argue that AIDS trans-
mission should be a felony because it is, in most cases, fatal.' 5 With
few exceptions, 6 the proposed and adopted laws characterize AIDS
tutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, E.
Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Linde,
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379
(1980); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983).
10. See Field, supra note 6, at 55-56 (tort law is preferable to criminal sanctions as a
means of inhibiting transmission of AIDS because criminal sanctions involve a greater
degree of state intrusion into a sensitive area of private life); see also Schultz, supra note
2, at 113 (criminal sanctions are an expensive, ineffective and counterproductive means
of reducing the spread of AIDS; however, prosecution may be appropriate in limited
circumstances where the defendant intended to transmit the disease and chose an effec-
tive way to do so).
11. See infra notes 20-22 for a discussion about some of these proposals.
12. M. DAVIS, LOVERS, DOCTORS, AND THE LAW: YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN TODAY'S SEX-HEALTH CRISIS, 88-89 (1988).
13. See infra note 25 (listing state criminal laws relating to venereal disease).
14. See DAVIS, supra note 12, at 88-89.
15. Id. at 70.
16. E.g. Pennsylvania HB 1787 (a person who knows that he has AIDS and trans-
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transmission as a felony.17
AIDS is transmitted by an exchange of bodily fluids containing the
AIDS virus (HIV). Consequently, any exchange of bodily fluids can
potentially transmit.the AIDS virus.' 8 Still, a great deal of uncertainty
exists as to the relative risk of transmission posed by different activi-
ties.' 9 One recognized means of transmitting AIDS is sexual inter-
course, both anal and vaginal. Hence, some laws prohibit transmission
by sexual contact.20 Other laws do not specify the means of transmis-
sion or attempted transmission, 2 while others are specific to blood or
organ donation. 22
Recently, Missouri adopted legislation criminalizing the conduct of
any individual knowingly infected with HIV who: (1) is or attempts to
be a blood, organ, sperm or tissue donor except as deemed necessary
for medical research; or (2) deliberately creates a grave and unjustifi-
able risk of infecting another with HIV through sexual or other con-
tact.23 This law represents a class D felony and carries a potential
mits it to another person through sexual contact commits a first degree misdemeanor)
(as cited in AIDS Law and Litigation Reporter, II).
17. See infra notes 20-21 for a description of felony provisions.
18. See supra note 3 for information about HIV. The virus is generally concen-
trated in blood and semen, but lower concentrations exist in other bodily fluids such as
saliva and tears. Effective transmission occurs only when the virus reaches another's
blood. Schultz, supra note 2, at 67 n. 12.
19. Id
20. A Hawaii bill would make it a felony for anyone diagnosed as suffering from
AIDS to knowingly expose another person to the AIDS virus through sexual contact.
Hawaii HB 2289-86. An Idaho bill, which the legislature defeated, prohibited donating
blood or plasma, biting, spitting and sexual intercourse by one who had or has a signifi-
cant likelihood of carrying the AIDS virus. Idaho HB 662. A Pennsylvania bill would
make it a misdemeanor for anyone who knows he is infected by AIDS to transmit the
disease to another person through sexual contact. Pennsylvania HB 1787. As cited in
AIDS Law and Litigation Reporter, 9-10.
21. A Colorado bill would make it a felony for anyone with knowledge or reason-
able grounds to suspect that he is infected with a deadly or disabling disease to willfully
or knowingly perform an act which exposes anotheir to or infects another with the dis-
ease. Colorado HB 1144. An Idaho bill would make it unlawful for anyone infected
with AIDS, ARC or other manifestations of HTLV-III infection to knowingly or will-
fully expose another person to the disease. Idaho HB 653 as cited in AIDS Law and
Litigation Reporter, 9-10.
22. A California proposal makes it a felony for any person who knows that he or
she has AIDS or the AIDS virus to donate blood, whether on a paid or volunteer basis.
California SB 2384 as cited in AIDS Law and Litigation Reporter, 9-10.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.677 (1988). See generally Schultz & Reuter, AIDS Leg-
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penalty of a maximum of five years imprisonment.2 4
In addition, AIDS transmission is potentially punishable under laws
criminalizing the sexual transmission of disease2 5 and laws criminaliz-
ing certain types of sexual conduct.26 Furthermore, traditional laws
proscribing offenses against the person such as murder,27 manslaugh-
ter,28 negligent homicide,2 9 attempted murder30 and assault l may also
islation in Missouri: An Analysis and a Proposal, 53 Mo. L. REV. 599 (1988) (analysis of
anticipated issues arising under Missouri AIDS law).
24. Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.011 (1986).
25. See Note, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital
Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 101, 116 n.95 (1984) which cites: ALA.
CODE § 22-16-17 (1977) (misdemeanor); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-4-401(2)-407 (1982)
(misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 701, 709 (1983) (fine up to $1,000 or im-
prisonment up to one year, or both); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 384.01, 384.03 (1986) (misde-
meanor); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-601-607 (1985) (misdemeanor); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2307 (McKinney 1985) (misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-519 (West
1984) (felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (1989) (misdemeanor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1106 (1982) (fine up to $500, or imprisonment up to two years, or both).
The following make it a misdemeanor to expose another to venereal disease: COLO.
REV. STAT. § 25-4-401(2) (1982) (misdemeanor to willfully expose); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 441.290 (1987) (misdemeanor to knowingly expose); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-60-
140 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (misdemeanor to expose another); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 34-23-1 (1986) (misdemeanor to expose another); TENN CODE ANN. §§ 68-10-107 -
111 (1987) (misdemeanor to expose another). See also DAVIs, supra note 12, at 72-80
(stating contents of 24 state laws making it a crime to infect another with venereal
disease).
26. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 70 n.29. Almost half of the states make voluntary
sodomy a crime. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-35-0 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2505 (Supp. 1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.89
(West Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 750.158 (1981), 750.338a, 750.338b (1985); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (Supp. 1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-505 (1985); NEV. REv. STAT. § 201.190 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.177
(1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (1983 & Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1
(1981 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE § 16-15-120 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612
(1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403
(1984 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1988); Wis. STAT. § 944.17 (1982 &
Supp. 1989).
27. Field, supra note 6, at 47.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 49.
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apply.
PART II
Because the majority of legislation criminalizing the transmission of
the AIDS virus is pending consideration or has been adopted only re-
cently, case law is nonexistent. Prosecutors traditionally bring cases
involving the transmission of AIDS under either traditional offenses
against the person such as aggravated assault or under laws which
criminalize the transmission of venereal disease. Because the AIDS ep-
idemic is relatively recent, the number of criminal transmission cases is
scant and the fact patterns vary greatly. Accordingly, no recognizable
pattern emerges. On the surface, prosecutors have not appeared to use
criminal sanctions to selectively prosecute homosexual men.
In California, a Los Angeles district attorney indicted a man for at-
tempted murder for selling his blood after learning he had AIDS. The
man subsequently pleaded guilty.32 In a military case, an Army soldier
knowingly exposed both a male and a female partner to the AIDS virus
through sexual intercourse. Neither partner knew that the accused was
infected with the AIDS virus.33 He was charged with two counts of
aggravated assault and court-martialed.34
A number of cases involve AIDS carriers biting or spitting at others.
In Michigan, a prosecutor charged an individual with assault and at-
tempt to commit murder, alleging that the defendant spit on two po-
licemen." The trial judge dismissed the case.36 Likewise, prosecutors
in San Francisco obtained a guilty plea of misdemeanor assault from a
man who bit a police officer.37 The court sentenced the defendant to
ninety days in jail.38 Prosecutors dropped a charge of felony assault
after discovering that the police officer, the alleged victim, was homo-
sexual and had a former lover with AIDS.3 9
32. DAvIs, supra note 12, at 86-87.
33. The Army dropped a separate count for aggravated assault relating to the of-
fender's sexual relations with another soldier. That soldier knew the defendant carried
the AIDS virus. Id. Army will try AIDS carrier, NAT'L L.J., June 15, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
34. Id.




39. Id. This case suggests another potential manifestation of prosecutor's discrimi-
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In U.S. v. Moore,40 a jury convicted a heroin addict on two counts of
assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon after a biting incident.41
Defendant, an inmate at a federal medical center, bit two federal cor-
rectional officers42 but did not transmit the virus. The defendant
moved for acquittal on the grounds that his mouth and teeth did not
constitute a deadly or dangerous weapon because of insufficient evi-
dence that human bites by AIDS carriers are likely to produce death or
great bodily harm.4 3 The district court denied defendant's motion and
held that, under the circumstances, the defendant's mouth and teeth
were deadly and dangerous weapons. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction.'
In three of these five cases, the intended victims were public officials
carrying out their public duties. These individuals probably reported
the incidents to prosecutors, suggesting that neither law enforcement
officers nor prosecutors are initiating investigations relating to AIDS
transmission. Rather, in the context of AIDS transmission, prosecu-
tors and law enforcement officials thus far are relying on a system of
passive enforcement. In other contexts, however, law enforcement of-
ficers have actively initiated investigation and sting operations which
target homosexuals.45
PART III
Laws criminalizing transmission of venereal disease and certain
types of sexual behavior have withstood facial constitutional attacks,4 6
but they have not always withstood constitutional attacks regarding
nation against homosexuals, specifically, the systematic refusal to pursue prosecution
where the victim is homosexual.
40. 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
41. Id. at 1164; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 (1982) and 1114 (Supp. IV 1987).
42. 846 F.2d at 1164-65.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1166-68.
45. See, ag., HOMOSEXUAL AcTIvrrY IS TARGETED, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May
14, 1989, § C, at 1, col. 2 (undercover operation to halt overt homosexual activity); St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, November 29, 1988, at 1, col. 3 (St. Louis City Vice squad con-
ducted sting operation arresting over 200 homosexual men for indecent exposure).
46. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia statute prohibit-
ing voluntary sodomy, reasoning that the statute does not violate privacy interests
granted by the constitution); State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(Missouri Supreme upholds voluntary sodomy statute under equal protection analysis
finding that statute rationally reduces transmission of AIDS virus).
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their application. Courts have upheld the constitutional validity of
such laws, suggesting that they would approve criminalizing AIDS
transmission.
Unlike a facial attack, a selective prosecution challenge is premised
on unconstitutional application of law. When a defendant prevails in a
selective prosecution challenge, the ruling affects the law only in cases
where enforcement decisions are factually similar. The statute, of
course, remains enforceable.
The Constitution is the primary constraint on prosecutorial con-
duct.47 Generally, a prosecutor has broad prosecutorial discretion. In
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,48 the Supreme Court held that "so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely
in his discretion."'49 However, when a prosecutor brings charges under
a rarely enforced law or brings charges against one class of violators
while ignoring others, a court may review the charging decision.50 In
such a case, the defendant may raise the defense of selective
prosecution.5 '
A selective prosecution defense does not challenge the merits of the
government's case against a defendant.52 Rather, it challenges the con-
stitutionality of the prosecutor's charging decision.53 Although a selec-
tive prosecution defense raises a number of constitutional problems,
including due process and the exercise of other guaranteed rights, 54
courts generally review selective prosecution claims utilizing equal pro-
tection standards.55
47. Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1365, 1366 (1987).
48. 434 U.S. 357, reh'g. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
49. Id. at 364.
50. Reiss, supra note 47, at 1369.
51. A challenge premised on selective prosecution is different from one alleging
prosecutorial vindictiveness. The latter involves a prosecutor's decision, on some im-
permissible basis, to charge under a more severe law or seek a more severe penalty. Id.
at 1374.
52. Id. at 1369.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1370. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605 (1985) (defend-
ant alleged selective prosecution on the basis of his exercise of his first amendment
right).
55. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608. The fourteenth amendment states in part: "No state
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/13
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In order to challenge the prosecutorial decision, a defendant must
first establish that the prosecutor in fact prosecuted the defendant but
did not prosecute similarly situated violators. Second, the defendant
must show that the prosecutor selected the defendant based upon an
impermissible consideration. 6 The presumption that prosecutors act
in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner in fulfilling their duty
to enforce the laws5 7 charges the defendant with the burdens of proof
and persuasion with respect to both elements." Once a defendant es-
tablishes a prima facia case of selective prosecution, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to show that he acted in a non-discriminatory
manner.
5 9
In order to show the first element of selective prosecution, a defend-
ant will typically present statistical evidence showing a lack of prosecu-
tions of others similarly situated.' This requirement presents two
problems. First, it is unclear whether defendant must prove only that
the government did not charge other violators, or further show that the
government was aware of specific violations which it chose not to pros-
ecute.61 At the very least, the defendant must identify specific simi-
larly situated violators that have not been prosecuted.6 2 Second, the
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
56. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating elements of selec-
tive prosecution claim, including selection of defendant for prosecution based on such
impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of
constitutional rights).
57. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973).
58. United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 445 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1227 (1984); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978).
59. Falk, 479 F.2d at 621. Some courts suggest that both the burden of proof and
the burden of production shift at this point. See United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d
1074, 1078 (4th Cir. 1972).
60. See, eg., United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1289 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 604 n.3 (1985)
(defendant established that the government was aware of 286 non-registrants out of an
estimated 674,000 nonregistrants and of these had indicted or intended to indict 16);
State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1967) (en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895 (1968).
See also Herbrand, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of
Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in State Criminal Proceedings, 95 A.L.R. 3d 280, 290-
93 (listing state cases supporting proposition that defendant must show that others simi-
larly situated are not generally prosecuted).
61. Reiss, supra note 47, at 1371 n.18.
62. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211-12 (defendant's allegation that
other violators existed was not sufficient to meet first element because defendant did not
identify the individuals with sufficient particularity).
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defendant must obtain evidence to demonstrate the prosecutor's failure
to prosecute similarly situated violators. Such evidence includes simi-
larly situated violators engaged in the same act as the defendant.63 The
difficulty arises because of the non-existence' or inaccessibility65 of
such evidence.
Many selective prosecution claimants have failed to establish the first
requirement66 although the second requirement, prosecutorial intent,
presents a more formidable hurdle.67 The second element requires a
showing that an impermissible factor influenced the prosecutor.68
Courts have identified three potentially impermissible prosecutorial
motives: (1) race, religion, or other suspect classification;69 (2) a desire
to impede the exercise of constitutional rights;7" and (3) personal vin-
dictiveness towards the defendant."' The Supreme Court has never
held that homosexuality is a quasi-suspect classification for purposes of
63. Reiss, supra note 47, at 1371 n.19. See also United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d
1173, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1977).
64. Reiss, supra note 47 at 1373 (noting that prosecutors do not have guidelines
governing charging decisions and hence, there is usually no documented administrative
decision-making for defendant to use).
65. Id. (noting that courts are generally reluctant to allow discovery necessary to
prove intent because such discovery is deemed overly intrusive with respect to the law
enforcement function.) See Note, Defense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory Prosecu-
tion, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 648, 661-62 (proposing that defendants through discovery
should have access to enforcement statistics).
66. See United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1017 (1978); United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290, 292-93 (Ist Cir. 1976);
United States v. Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245, 1251-52 (D.S.D. 1973).
67. Reiss, supra note 47, at 1372.
68. The extent to which the impermissible basis represents a factor is unclear. The
impermissible basis could be (1) the sole or dominant factor in the charging decision; (2)
a lesser "but for" cause of the prosecutor's selection of the defendant; or (3) only one of
a number of reasons. Reiss, supra note 47, at 1372 n.25. See also Herbrand, supra note
60, at 293 (listing state cases supporting proposition that discrimination must be inten-
tional or purposeful).
Recently, the Supreme Court indicated that where the defendant establishes a facially
discriminatory enforcement classification, discriminatory intent is presumed. Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) ("A showing of discriminatory intent is not
necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory
classification.").
69. See United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 241 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1209 (2d Cir. 1974)) (Italian defendant).
70. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610-14 (first amendment rights); United States v.
Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1984) (first amendment rights).
71. United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1275 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing




Furthermore, with respect to prosecutorial intent, the Supreme
Court has recently held that where the prosecutor utilizes a system of
passive enforcement, 73 the prosecutor manifested discriminatory in-
tent. In Wayte v. United States,7 4 prosecutors charged the defendant
with knowingly and willfully failing to register with the Selective Ser-
vice System. The defendant asserted a selective prosecution defense on
the grounds that the prosecutor impermissibly based the charging deci-
sion on the defendant's exercise of his first amendment right to free
speech. 7' The Court rejected the defendant's argument because the
government did not proceed against all "vocal" non-registrants.7 6 The
Wayte case highlights the court's unwillingness to find discriminatory
intent where the enforcement decision is in part a function of the infor-
mation available to the prosecution.
While nondiscriminatory enforcement is the ideal, discriminatory
enforcement remains because of the defendant's heavy burden in estab-
lishing a prima facia case of selective prosecution and then rebutting
any subsequent governmental justifications. Indeed, commentators
note that selective prosecution claims rarely succeed.77
PART IV
Despite the futility in raising a selective prosecution claim, male ho-
mosexual defendants have raised the defense. These cases typically
arise in the context of a prosecution under a jurisdiction's sodomy law.
The defendants in these cases do not necessarily allege that prosecutors
72. Race, religion, illegitimacy and national origin are suspect classifications war-
ranting strict scrutiny. Sex is a quasi-suspect classification warranting an intermediate
level of scrutiny. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 474 U.S. 1039 (1986) (homosexuals do not
have fundamental right to private consensual sodomy under substantive due process
law).
73. Under a system of "passive enforcement," the government prosecuted only
those violators who advised the Selective Service that they failed to register or whom
others reported as having failed to register. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-9 (1985).
74. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
75. Id. at 604-05.
76. Id. at 609. The government had a "beg" policy under which it gave "vocal"
nonregistrants a final opportunity to register and thereby avoid prosecution. The gov-
ernment did not prosecute those who protested registration but later registered. Id
77. Reiss, supra note 47, at 1373; Herbrand, supra note 60, at 288 (noting compara-
tively small number of cases where courts have found that a defendant established a
case of selective prosecution).
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are charging homosexual violators while excluding similarly situated
heterosexual violators.
In State v. Rhinehart,7 8 for example, the defendant alleged that he
was singled out for prosecution under a state sodomy law because the
prosecution failed to charge other known homosexual violators. The
court rejected the defendant's allegation that he was "singled out" by
noting that the prosecutor brought between twelve to twenty-four sod-
omy cases annually.7 9
In United States v. Cozart,8° the defendant alleged gender classifica-
tion discrimination rather than discrimination based on sexual prefer-
ence. The defendant alleged that prosecutors charged male
homosexual violators under the District of Columbia's law proscribing
solicitation to commit sodomy, but not similarly situated female viola-
tors.81 The court rejected the defendant's claim and held that the de-
fendant did not establish a selective prosecution defense when evidence
manifested no indication of police knowledge of female homosexual vi-
olators.8 2 The court noted that the failure to prosecute similarly situ-
ated violators owing to a mere lack of knowledge does not constitute a
denial of equal protection.8 3
Cases exist, however, in which homosexual defendants rely on the
classification of sexual preference to assert a selective prosecution de-
fense. In Stewart v. United States, 4 a defendant charged with at-
tempted sodomy challenged the decision to prosecute on the grounds
that district attorneys enforced the sodomy law against homosexual vi-
olators but not against heterosexual violators.8 5 The court rejected the
defendant's selective prosecution defense because of law enforcement's
lack of knowledge concerning heterosexual acts of sodomy. 6 The
Stewart court noted that a facially neutral law having a disparate im-
pact on homosexuals does not necessarily violate equal protection
78. 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424 P.2d 906, cert denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967), aff'd sub
nom. Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1971)
(denying habeas corpus petition).
79. Id.
80. 321 A.2d 342 (D.C. 1974).
81. Id
82. Id.
83. Id. at 344.






In each of these cases, the courts noted that the mere failure to pros-
ecute similarly situated violators did not by itself constitute a denial of
equal protection. The courts rejected the defendants' selective prosecu-
tion challenge because the defendants did not sufficiently show inten-
tional or purposeful discrimination. In Stewart and Cozart, specifically,
the prosecutors' lack of knowledge of similarly situated violators was
critical.
CONCLUSION
As previously noted, proof of discriminatory intent is the major bar-
rier defendants face when asserting a selective prosecution defense. Be-
cause of the difficulty in establishing a prima facia case of
discriminatory prosecution, the unprotected status of homosexual per-
sons under equal protection law, and the relative prevalence of AIDS
in the homosexual male community, it is extremely unlikely that a ho-
mosexual person charged with violating an AIDS transmission law
would prevail on a selective prosecution defense. Thus, laws criminal-
izing AIDS transmission create potential for discriminatory anti-ho-
mosexual conduct by law enforcement officers.
Theoretically, government enforcement can vary greatly in terms of
the extent to which it initiates and pursues an investigation of potential
violations. For example, the government may actively gather informa-
tion about AIDS cases from public health officials, then initiate investi-
gation on the basis of this information." Government could also
actively initiate and utilize investigative techniques aimed at homosex-
ual violators as it has with respect to sodomy laws.89 The government
could also seek prosecution only on the basis of victim-initiated com-
plaints. Clearly, the third scenario is the most passive means of en-
forcement and involves the least amount of discretion with respect to
discovering complaints upon which to base a prosecution.
To counter the potential danger of anti-homosexual conduct by law
enforcement, legislators should consider adding provisions to the new
87. Id. at 1208 (citing Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552,
556 (1947) and Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
88. The possibility of this type of enforcement policy would greatly depend on the
jurisdiction's confidentiality laws.
89. An example of techniques aimed at homosexual violators is the recent numerous
raids on public rest rooms in Forest Park in St. Louis, Missouri where over 200 arrests
of homosexual men were made. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
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criminal statutes limiting prosecutorial discretion. For example, policy
makers could include a provision limiting enforcement to cases in
which a victim brings the alleged violation to the attention of law en-
forcement personnel. Legislatures could also require the state attorney
general to issue regulations governing enforcement of the AIDS trans-
mission laws which promote nondiscriminatory decision-making.
While policy makers will continue to debate the merits of laws
criminalizing AIDS transmission, provisions limiting prosecutorial dis-
cretion alleviate some of the concern about the potential for discrimi-
nation against homosexual people.
Anne R. Spiegelman*
* J.D. 1989, Washington University.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/13
